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Analysis of the criteria of the National Economic Prosecutor's Office on resale price maintenance based on the current standard in European law
Authors
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Nicole Nehme Zalaquett
Universidad de Chile
https://orcid.org/0009-0000-5060-1590
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Benjamín Mordoj Hutter
Ferrada Nehme
https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7364-2706
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Abstract
This article compares the standard established by the Chilean National Economic Prosecutor’s Office in matters of resale price maintenance, particularly in its fixed or minimum resale variant, with the approach developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union following the 2023 Super Bock case. This comparison is relevant given the influence that European Community law exerts on Chilean competition practice. After outlining the differences between the two jurisdictions, and in particular, after detailing how the Prosecutor’s Office, in its most recent administrative decisions, has maintained a standard largely consisting with EU case law and regulations prior to Super Bock —classifying minimum or fixed resale price maintenance as inherently anticompetitive—, this article seeks to provide arguments for aligning Chilean competition enforcement with the Super Bock precedent. Moving in this direction would also help bring the Prosecutor’s Office’s approach closer to that of the Chilean Competition Tribunal, given that a divergence currently exists between the perspectives of these two institutions. Greater alignment would, therefore, enhance the coherence of the Chilean legal framework.
Keywords:
National Economic Prosecutor's Office , Resale price maintenance , Vertical restraints , Chilean Competition TribunalReferences
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