The Role of Agency in the Hybrid Identity of Neurotechnological Patients
Authors
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Jorge Ignacio Fuentes
Centro de Bioética, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
https://orcid.org/0009-0000-1414-2315
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Abel Wajnerman Paz
Instituto de Éticas Aplicadas, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1551-527X
Abstract
Recently, the integration between neurotechnologies and human beings has been analyzed using the extended mind theory in neuroethics literature. The discussion has been focused on finding dimensions to assess the integration of the devices in their users’ cognitive functions. This approach has been relatively successful in elucidating the ethical parity of the devices regarding the organic body. However, the mentioned integration poses at least three additional challenges that have not been addressed in the literature and require a new conceptual framework. The first relates to the distinction between moral agency and patiency. The current framework addresses only the latter. The other two are in part entailed by this. The second one is the distinction between a sense of body ownership and a sense of agency. The focus on moral patiency disregards fundamental phenomenal dimensions of integration with neurotechnology. T. Finally, the possibility that the device acts coercively over our cognitive systems is a problematic form of integration that cannot be addressed adequately within current frameworks. We argue that these three challenges can be better faced by exploring a new approach to personal identity that highlights the ethical dimensions mentioned.
Keywords:
Neuroethics, Neurotechnology, Brain-computer interfaces, Extended mind, Personal identityReferences
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