The duty of cooperation of the whistleblower in the Chilean competition system

Abstract

This article analyzes the regulation of the whistleblower’s duty to cooperate within the framework of Chile’s leniency program, considered one of the key pillars for the effective detection and punishment of collusive behavior. Active collaboration by the applicant or beneficiary is essential for the success of the leniency program, and the legislation sets out clear sanctions for failure to cooperate during both administrative and criminal proceedings. However, at the judicial stage before the Chilean Competition Tribunal, this duty is not explicitly recognized, resulting in a significant legal gap. The absence of clear rules may create uncertainty regarding the whistleblower’s obligations and reduce their incentives to maintain full cooperation with the authorities during the judicial process, thereby weakening the effectiveness of the mechanism and, ultimately, the system’s ability to effectively punish collusion. Therefore, the article concludes that legislative amendments are needed to explicitly incorporate the duty of cooperation at this stage, ensuring legal coherence and strengthening confidence in leniency as a key tool in the fight against anticompetitive agreements.